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Introduction
A notable development in Asian international relations studies since the end of the ColdWar has been the development of a significant body of theoretical literature to explainthe evolution of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Thus, analysts havedebated whether ASEAN is a security community (Acharya, 2009a, 2009b, 2012;Emmerson, 2012; Khoo, 2015); engaged in theoretical reflections on the relevance ofnon-material as opposed to material determinants in regional affairs (Jones and Smith,
22006, 2007a, 2007b; Peou, 2002); and considered whether the region or the state is theappropriate level of analysis (Ba, 2009; Jones, 2012; Jones and Smith, 2006, 2007a,2007b). This article continues this debate. Its point of departure is the claim that whilethe analysts cited above have considerably advanced the theoretical debate on the role ofASEAN in regional politics, a gap remains. In particular, theorists have tended to adoptunnecessarily polarized positions on ASEAN’s autonomy in regional politics. On onehand, an identifiable group of theorists, associated with constructivist theory, haveemphasized the organization’s autonomy from external interference (Acharya, 2009a,2009b, 2012; Ba, 2009). On the other, theorists of a realist and critical theory persuasion,contend that ASEAN has highly circumscribed autonomy from external interference(Jones, 2012; Jones and Smith, 2006, 2007a, 2007b). What has not been sufficientlyexplored is the conceptual space that examines the relationship between regional statesand extra-regional states.
This article attempts to do precisely this, with reference to a case study of ASEAN’s policyon the South China Sea since the end of the Cold War. It is our contention that ASEAN’srecord on the South China Sea is not adequately explained by reference to existingperspectives. Instead, we seek to advance an alternative explanation, rooted in neo-realist theory, and to develop a theory of regional politics, which involves the interactionbetween ASEAN as an organization and the ASEAN vanguard state(s), in respect to theSouth China Sea issue. According to this vanguard state theory, ASEAN’s autonomy is acontingent one, reflecting the interests of what we call a vanguard state and an extra-regional state, in this case, the United States (U.S.). Thus, ASEAN’s travails with China overthe South China Sea are a reflection of its vanguard states’ inability to secure externalgreat power actor guarantees to counter China’s territorial advances. To the extent
3ASEAN has made some limited progress in defending its regional autonomy from China’sintervention since 2013, it is a consequence of a convergence of interests between itsvanguard states and an external actor, the United States, all of whom have agency.
Contending Explanations
There are three existing explanations that are relevant to explaining ASEAN’s policy onthe South China Sea since the end of the Cold War. The first of these approaches,represented by the constructivist perspective, has emphasized ASEAN’s ability to upholdthe principle of regional autonomy from external interference by external powers(Acharya, 2009a, 2009b, 2012; Ba, 2009; Haacke, 2003). A second approach, reflected inthe realist school, takes a contrary stance. According to this view, ASEAN has severelylimited ability to uphold regional autonomy from external interference (Jones & Smith,2002, 2006, 2007a, 2007b, Leifer, 1991, 1999, 2000). A third approach, associated withcritical theory, also views ASEAN’s autonomy as limited, but in a different way fromrealists. Here, outcomes are contingent on intra-state struggle between socio-politicalforces (Jones, 2012). As our analysis will show, each of these explanations has limitations.In this article we offer an alternative understanding, rooted in realist theory, whereASEAN’s autonomy is highly dependent on the convergence of interests between ASEANand an external actor.
The Constructivist Argument
4Central to the constructivist view is the belief that norms coordinate values among states(Acharya, 2009a, p. 26). In this view, norms are mutually reinforcing and mutuallyconstituted (Acharya, 2009a, p. 26). Thus, Haacke (2003, p. 7) contends that ASEANnorms help to ‘build trust in the interaction context among ASEAN leaders and topromote interstate and regional stability’. A strong theme in the constructivist literatureis the claim that despite challenges, ASEAN has successfully upheld the norm of regionalautonomy. Thus, Acharya (2009a, p. 62) highlights the growing importance of theregional autonomy norm during the Cold War period, when the ‘need for greater self-reliance in managing the region’s security problems emerged as a key ASEAN norm’. ForBa (2009, pp. 11-12), ASEAN’s founding narrative about its relationship to interventionand the need for unity has pointed ‘states towards regional, Southeast Asian [italics intext] solutions in response to insecurity’.
These authors concede that the South China Sea dispute has tested ASEAN’s norms. ForBa (2009, p. 161), the South China Sea dispute ‘would in fact become the defining issue ofASEAN-China relations in the 1990s’. Similarly, Haacke (2003, pp. 122-123) argues thatChina, in seeking to enforce its territorial claims, has appeared to challenge ASEAN’snorms on the non-use of force and restraint. Acharya (2009a, p. 157) admits that theSouth China Sea dispute ‘posed a serious test of ASEAN’s unity and of its normsconcerning the peaceful settlement of disputes’. However, all authors see ASEAN asupholding its norms, and maintaining its autonomy. For Haacke (2003, p. 126, p. 125),China has ‘incrementally allowed discussions on the Spratlys to deepen’, and ASEAN has‘succeeded in allaying the remaining fears of the Chinese about the purpose of ASEAN’smultilateral venture[s]’. For Ba (2009, pp. 176-177), ASEAN rejected traditional alliancesand security arrangements when confronted by China’s challenge to ASEAN on the South
5China Sea dispute. Success has accompanied ASEAN’s focus on socializing China throughan enhanced security dialogue based on existing ASEAN frameworks, notably the ASEANRegional Forum (ARF) (Ba, 2009; Johnston, 1999; Johnston, 2008). Indeed, Acharya(2009a, p. 211) states that since the mid-1990s, China began ‘to take a more supportiverole in multilateralism and the ARF’. Specifically, ‘ASEAN was able to secure an agreementfrom Beijing to conduct Sino-ASEAN multilateral consultations on security issues’(Acharya, 2009a, p. 158). In this view, ‘China has come to acknowledge the usefulness ofthe ARF as the only multilateral venue available to it where it can discuss and share itssecurity concerns and approach with Asia-Pacific countries’ (Acharya, 2009a, p. 211).Accordingly, ASEAN can ‘claim some success in dealing with China on the Spratlys issue’(Acharya, 2009a, p. 158).
The foregoing claims are difficult to reconcile with actual record of Sino-ASEANinteraction on the South China Sea issue (Taylor, 2011). ASEAN’s multilateral diplomacyat the ARF and related ASEAN fora has consistently failed to make substantive headwayon the dispute. Instead of ASEAN’s norms socialising China, or enhancing regional unity,China has succeeded in dividing the ASEAN states and advancing its position in the SouthChina Sea. Significantly, in 2012, the ASEAN states were unable to reach an agreementon the South China Sea, and failed to issue a joint communiqué for the first time in itshistory (Zhang, 2015, p. 74). More importantly, ASEAN’s maritime sovereignty continuesto be violated by China (International Crisis Group, 2012b). To counter this, regionalstates have increasingly sought external power security guarantees, most notably fromthe United States (Tan, 2011, p. 149). This leads us to examine other perspectives toexplain ASEAN’s record on regional autonomy.
6The Realist Argument
Realist scholars take a very different view of ASEAN regional autonomy. According toLeifer (2000, p. 108), the ASEAN aphorism of ‘regional solutions for regional problems’ ismore ‘a slogan serving a particular interest than an operational policy accepted andapplied on a regional basis in any common interest’. In this view, the underlyingbehaviour of ASEAN actually conforms to the realist power-politics model (Jones andSmith, 2002, p.102). According to Jones, Khoo and Smith (2013, p. 111), ‘actual resolutionof the South China Sea dispute remained stalemated in the ARF’s preferred strategy ofmanaging problems rather than solving them’. This stalemate ‘serves China’s rather thanASEAN’s long term strategic interest’ (Jones, Khoo & Smith, 2013, p. 111). Rather thanpursuing cooperative security through the ARF, there has been a ‘classic recourse tohedging by weaker ASEAN states in an area of growing great power rivalry’ (Jones, Khoo& Smith, 2013, p. 112). The dispute therefore demonstrates ‘how more powerful actorscan manipulate ASEAN’s pliable norms to advance grand strategic interests’ (Jones, Khoo& Smith, 2013, p. 113).
For Leifer (1999, p. 7, p. 8), a major problem is that in addition to a ‘lack of political will’to resolve the dispute, there is an ‘absence of any regional machinery for addressing thecomplex contention’ in the South China Sea. Leifer (1999, p. 8) argues that the SouthChina Sea issue ‘is symptomatic of the problem of regional order in a strategically-fusedEast and South East Asia, which lacks a security architecture’. Ultimately, Leifer doubtsASEAN’s capability to effectively deal with the South China Sea dispute. Instead, ‘the roleof the United States remains critical’ (Leifer, 1991, p. 135). In this view, ‘regional securitywould seem to require that such countervailing power, if it cannot be generated locally
7on a cooperative basis, should be available from an acceptable external source for whichthere is only one candidate’ (Leifer, 1991, p. 135).
Realist scholars offer a strong counter argument to the constructivist view. ASEANregional institutions have demonstrably been incapable of resolving the South China Seadispute. Instead, China has succeeded in dividing the ASEAN states, and utilized theexisting institutional incoherence for its strategic advantage. These analysts’ emphasison the role of an external actor, the U.S., is indeed a necessary one. China’s gains in theSouth China Sea have been predicated on an insufficiently robust U.S. response (Jonesand Smith, 2007b, p. 179). However, while the role of external powers remains a criticalfactor in the story, the fact is that regional states possess a greater capacity to secure theirown interests than has been acknowledged by the realists cited above. In theoreticalterms, ASEAN states have greater autonomy, and hence state power, than they currentlyallow for. As our analysis will show, particularly in the post-2013 period, the Philippinesand Vietnam have actively sought, and partially secured, security commitments from theU.S., and a variety of external powers including Japan and India. This aspect of regionaldynamics requires further theorising, which we will offer in our alternative explanatorymodel.
8The Critical Theory Argument
Adopting a critical theoretical approach, Jones (2012) attempts to advance a perspectivewhere regional autonomy is highly circumscribed, but in ways that depart from the realistunderstanding. For Jones (2012, p. 2), external ‘intervention and the non-interferenceprinciple can be explained as the outcome of struggles between and within ASEAN’s mostpowerful social forces’. For Jones (2012, p. 8), sovereignty and non-interference can beanalyzed as a ‘technology of power’ mechanism, which is used by domestic groups withinASEAN to determine the scope of political conflict in a way that best suits their needs.Because of this ‘intimate relationship between sovereignty and social order’, sovereigntyis always subject to contestation by socio-political forces (Jones, 2012, p. 11). In thecontext of domestic conflict, the state and its institutions are subject to capture by theowners of capital. Once capture is effected, the state, by invoking the non-interferencenorm, is able to contain socio-political conflict and exclude outside influences that maywish to aid alternative social groups. Thus, at the international level, non-interferencecan be invoked or discarded to suit particular state interests or strategies (Jones, 2012,p. 8). This explains the mixed record in Southeast Asia, of sovereignty violation and theinconsistent adherence to the norm of non-interference.
The critical theory perspective is unable to adequately account for the empirical recordof Sino-ASEAN South China Sea interactions. In two important respects, the South ChinaSea dispute represents a direct challenge to the view that sovereignty is contingent uponthe role of ASEAN domestic forces. First, the dispute involves key external powers, mostnotably China and the United States. The interaction of these states with regional powersis integral to any analysis of the conflict. Second, it is not clear what impact, if any, ASEAN
9domestic groups have had on the conflict. This raises serious questions about therelevance of the critical theory approach to an analysis of this central issue in ASEAN’spost-Cold War international relations.
Vanguard State Theory1
Our analysis seeks to advance a fourth perspective, where state autonomy, and an intenseconcern with avoiding sovereignty violation, reflects a deeper concern with state survival(Krasner, 1999, Mann, 1984; Waltz, 1979). In this very important sense, autonomy,sovereignty, and state survival are reflected in the pursuit of interest convergencebetween ASEAN states and external great powers. The emphasis in this article oninterests reflects the authors’ self-identification as realists. Consistent with a realisttheoretical approach, we draw on a realist understanding of how interests are defined, inits capacity as a theory of foreign policy (Elman, 1996). Following the work of Krasner(1978, p. 12), for analytical purposes, states are analysed in this article as unitary rationalactors, pursuing aims understood in terms of the national interest.
Interests enjoy a venerable tradition within the realist literature, where there exists aconsistent view of the basic state interest, which is state survival.2 When a state must actto ensure its survival, this constrains a state’s consideration of broader interests (Zakaria,1998, p. 186). This corresponds to Wolfers’ (1962, pp. 13-14) analogy of state actionunder conditions of high threat. For example, classical realist Hans Morgenthau (1967, p.10) argues that ‘the state has no right to let its moral disapprobation of the infringementof liberty get in the way of successful political action, itself inspired by the moral principleof national survival’. Similarly, neorealist Kenneth Waltz (1979, p. 134) believes that
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‘states strive to secure their survival’ and ‘that by comparing nations and corporations,the elusive notion of national interest is made clear’. John Mearsheimer (2001, p. 31)reaffirms this view, stating that ‘survival is the primary goal of great powers’. Thisstatement can be generalized to non-great powers. As Elman (1996, p. 31) notes, ‘becauseof their diminished capabilities relative to others, small states lack a margin for time anderror---they must be closely attuned to the external environment because their survivalis at stake and the costs of being exploited are high’. Indeed, it is a fairly solid consensusamong neorealist scholars that the foreign policy of non-great powers, including smallstates, will reflect system-level constraints (Elman, 1996, p.31). Of course, survival is notalways at stake. During periods of relative peace, states ‘have the “luxury” of choosingtheir interests and goals’ (Zakaria, 1998, p. 186). During such times, a range of othervalues will be sought, including ‘rank, respect, material possessions and materialprivileges’ (Wolfers, 1952, p. 489).
Clearly, varying degrees of interest convergence are possible, and interests can changeover time. Partial interest convergence between an ASEAN state and external actor isunlikely to elicit the high levels of sustained cooperation required to cause ASEAN stateresistance to sovereignty violation. Typically, a high level of interest convergence isrequired to elicit the level of cooperation required to resist violations to statesovereignty. Also, interest convergence is a dynamic process, where small states activelyseek ‘maximum great-power commitment to their security interests while trying tominimise the price of obtaining that support’ (Ciorciari, 2010, p. 2). Small states act in thismanner because they ‘generally lack formidable independent power capabilities’, and assuch, ‘cannot affect the international security landscape on their own’ (Ciorciari, 2010, p.1). However, because some small states ‘occupy strategic positions’, they can ‘affect the
11
overall global distribution of power by adding to the resources of some great powers andconstraining others’ (Ciorciari, 2010, p. 1).
Engaging with this literature, our analysis begins with the underlying premise that thestudy of interest convergence can yield utility to the field of Southeast Asian internationalrelations. The ASEAN vanguard states under consideration, the Philippines and Vietnam,are at once highly vulnerable and lodged in a strategic location. They have a clear interestin establishing interest convergence with the U.S., to resist China’s advances. Indeed, asthis study will seek to show, without external actor interest convergence, these stateshave had great difficulty resisting sovereignty violations from China. During periods ofdecreased interest convergence, this study shares the same expectations as Leifer andJones and Smith, and is consistent with existing realist literature. However, when a clearinterest convergence occurs between an ASEAN state and an external power, asubstantial compact is constructed. At this time, an ASEAN vanguard state has an activeand substantial role in resisting sovereignty violations from other external powers. Inshort, contra the existing realist view, an ASEAN vanguard state has substantial agency,and plays the important and necessary function of actively seeking and supporting a greatpower commitment to regional policies, or phrased differently, intervention in regionalaffairs. At the same time, contrary to the constructivist view, this agency is highlyqualified.
To understand and explain ASEAN’s record on the South China Sea, our analysis advancesa perspective, which we call vanguard state theory. A ‘vanguard state’ is conceptualizedas an ASEAN state, which comes to the fore of the Association when it has vital interestsat stake that it wishes to defend (Crawford, 2003, pp. 30-31; Press, 2005, pp. 25-28).
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Crawford (2003, p. 31) defines vital interests as involving ‘self-preservation, politicalindependence, and, by extension, defence of strategically vital areas’. Similarly, Press(2005, p. 26) defines vital interests as preservation of ‘sovereignty’. Secondary interestscan vary greatly, and may range ‘from very important interests, such as maintaining traderoutes, the safety of your allies, and even national “prestige”, to much more ephemeralones’ (Crawford, 2003, p. 31). Interests pertaining to national self-preservation logicallymust take precedence. This is because weak states have, ‘less room for choice in thedecision-making process. Their smaller margin of error and hence greater preoccupationwith survival makes the essential interests of weak states less ambiguous’ (Handel, 1981,p. 3).
Vanguard state behaviour is logically understood as a staged process involving first themaximization of security (Waltz, 1979, p. 134), and only then the maximization of power(Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 33). An ASEAN state only begins to assume the role of vanguardstate when vital interests are at stake, when state security is threatened. The theory doesnot preclude more than one ASEAN state from assuming the role of vanguard state.However, states must have compelling interests at stake in a given issue, and there mustbe some degree of coordination between them. Once a vanguard state has come toprominence, it will perform two major functions, which reflect an external balancing logic(Waltz, 1979, p. 168). First, because it lacks ‘formidable independent power capabilities’(Ciorciari, 2010, p. 1), the vanguard state will actively seek out an external power whoseinterests align with its own. Second, the vanguard state will seek to portray a unitedASEAN front in support of its interests, by engaging and mobilizing states within theinstitution. At this time, an ASEAN vanguard state has an active and substantial role inresisting sovereignty violations from external powers.
13
Critically, there must be an external power that is sufficiently interested in regionalaffairs. Here, the external power must have identifiable interests and be willing to act onthose interests. There are a number of different strategies at a vanguard state’s disposalto engage an external power, establishing an alignment of interests. These include thedevelopment of bilateral diplomatic interactions, various types of military co-operation,and the development of economic ties. A vanguard state may subsequently move tofurther solidify interest convergence with other regional states. The upshot is thatwithout a substantial interest convergence, ASEAN is unable to resist violations to itsovereignty, and its autonomy will be increasingly compromised. In the subsequentsections, we will seek to show an increasing partial alignment of interests between thetwo vanguard states, the Philippines and Vietnam, and the external actor, the UnitedStates. In fact, it is the partial nature of interest alignment that explains the ineffectiveresponse by ASEAN to Chinese policy on the South China Sea issue.
Vanguard State Theory: The Philippines, Vietnam and the United States
From 1992 to 2012, ASEAN’s policy on the South China Sea is explained by its inability toestablish a robust convergence of interest with the U.S., the only state that has thewherewithal to seriously counter China. In this sense, this part of the narrative is anexamination of policy failure. Accordingly, this is also the period when China has madesustained advances in its position in the South China Sea. A clear turning-point occurredin the period beginning in 2013, with the emergence of a more robust U.S. interest indealing with the South China Sea issue. The subsequent convergence of interest between
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the Philippines, Vietnam, and the United States has served as the basis for pushbackagainst China in the South China Sea.
ASEAN’s Failure, 1992-2012
The South China Sea issue was not an inactive one during the Cold War (Valencia, 1995).However, in the post-Cold War era, the issue has taken on a new impetus, particularly inChinese foreign policy. Two reasons explain this. First, like all great powers, China seeksto control its immediate regional space to the extent that circumstances allow. China hasdone this by projecting its power into the East China and South China Sea (Mearsheimer,2001, p. 376). Second, China has become a net importer of petroleum in 1993, emergingas the second largest importer in 2009 (behind the U.S.). The possibility of untapped oilin the seabed of the South China Sea has raised the stakes. This would easily explain a lawpassed by China’s National People’s Congress in 1992, in which Beijing asserted its claimsto the South China Sea, with the implicit threat to use force to enforce these claims (Tan,2011, p. 147).
In any case, the period from late 1994 to 1995 saw China occupying the contestedMischief Reef area, building structures in an area claimed by the Philippines. A variety ofactors ranging from Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam havemaintained counter-claims to China’s, adding to the intractability of the issue. In 1996,China ratified the United Nations’ Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), but optedout of its dispute settlement mechanism. After a period of relative calm following thesigning of the 2002 Declaration of Conduct on the South China Sea, these maritimedisputes have emerged as an even more serious regional security issue. In 2008, an
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agreement signed by China, the Philippines and Vietnam to conduct a joint seismic surveyof disputed areas in the South China Sea lapsed (International Crisis Group, 2012b, pp. 6-7).
Against the backdrop of the failure to achieve noticeable progress on the South China Seadisputes, in May 2009, Malaysia and Vietnam made a joint submission to UNCLOS on theirterritorial claims in the South China Sea. In response, China submitted a map to UNCLOSthat appeared to assert Chinese sovereignty over most of the South China Sea, includingnot only land features, but also the waters inside the line.3 These conflicting claimsfocused regional attention on the July 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi. At themeeting, the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared freedom of navigation in theSouth China Sea to be a U.S. ‘national interest’, and called for the peaceful settlement ofmaritime disputes based on UNCLOS (Lander, 2010). In response, Chinese ForeignMinister Yang Jiechi responded with what one U.S. official described as ‘a twenty-five-minute stem-winder that shook the meeting’ (Bader, 2012, p. 105). Yang countered thatSecretary Clinton’s comments, ‘were, in effect, an attack on China’ (Bader, p. 105). Yang,who reportedly was ‘staring directly at Secretary Clinton for much of the time’, declared‘China is a big country. Bigger than any other countries here’ (Bader, p, 105). Since thisincident, there has been a marked deterioration in Sino-ASEAN relations over the SouthChina Sea.
In the absence of a direct and forceful response by the U.S., China has made significantadvances in extending its control over the South China Sea from 2010-12. In September2010, the Chinese government seized a Vietnamese shipping vessel in the vicinity of theParacel Islands. At the ASEAN Defence Minister’s Meeting (ADMM) Plus Eight Meeting in
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Hanoi in mid-October 2010, Vietnam placed the issue of the South China Sea territorialdisputes on the agenda for discussion. While no actual progress was achieved at themeeting, this act itself was a direct challenge to China. Beijing has consistently refused amultilateral approach to the dispute, insisting instead on settling claims bilaterally.China’s subsequent disputes with the Philippines and Vietnam intensified. In March 2011,a standoff occurred when a Filipino vessel was conducting a seismic survey in the naturalgas-rich Reed Bank in the Spratly Islands. Manila claimed that four similar skirmishesoccurred between April and May. The Aquino government subsequently began referringto the South China Sea as the ‘West Philippine Sea’ (International Crisis Group, 2012b, p.7).
In July 2011, ASEAN and China agreed to a set of guidelines for implementing the 2002Sino-ASEAN DOC on the South China Sea. In January 2012, a meeting led to theestablishment of four working groups to explore marine environmental co-operation,marine scientific research, search and rescue operations, and ways to combattransnational crime. However, at the same time that Beijing appeared to embrace a moreaccommodating stance, it was also prepared to respond robustly to defend its interests.Another standoff occurred between Chinese and Filipino naval vessels over theScarborough shoal in the Spratly Island chain in April-May 2012, with China out-manoeuvring the Philippines. With a typhoon approaching, both sides agreed towithdraw from the area. The Chinese quickly returned to occupy the shoal in June,claiming ownership without firing a shot. Meanwhile, China protested Vietnam’s passageof a June 2012 maritime law declaring sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands.In that same month, China unilaterally established a municipality called Sansha (threesandbanks in Chinese) in the South China Sea, with Yongxing (or Woody) island serving
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as the administrative hub. According to the official Chinese Xinhua news agency, Sansha’sjurisdiction extends over 13 square kilometres of land and 2 million square kilometres ofsurrounding water, effectively establishing Chinese control over much of the South ChinaSea (Associated Press, 2012). In a direct challenge to Vietnam, the China NationalOffshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) invited bids for a new batch of oil exploration blocks,some of which were within the 200 nautical mile limit that Vietnam claims as its exclusiveeconomic zone.
Events came to a head in July 2012, when ASEAN failed to release a Joint Communiquéfollowing the forty-fifth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. This was the first time in theAssociation’s forty-five year history that this had occurred. Both the Philippines andVietnam requested that the joint statement include references to their maritime disputeswith China. The Philippines wanted to include an objection to the deployment of Chineseparamilitary vessels in Scarborough Shoal (Thayer, 2013, p. 78). Vietnam wanted toinclude an objection to China’s announcement that it would lease oil blocks that fellwithin Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone (Thayer, 2013, p. 78). However, Cambodia’sforeign minister Hor Nam Hong, as ASEAN chair, blocked any mention of the dispute,claiming that these were bilateral issues and should therefore not be included (Thayer,2013, p. 78). At the November East Asian Summit, also held in Phnom Penh, Cambodiaand China again tried to neutralize debate over the South China Sea dispute. Chairing theSummit once more, Cambodia unilaterally announced that ASEAN had agreed with Chinathat ‘they would not internationalize the South China Sea’, and focus instead on ‘theexisting ASEAN-China mechanisms’ (Bland, 2012). If anything, the ability of ASEAN andChina to reach an accommodation on the South China Sea dispute has declined after the
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ascension of a new Chinese leader, Xi Jinping in late 2012 (International Crisis Group,2015).
Turning Point: Enter the U.S.
To the extent that the narrative in the pre-2013 period is a case study of policy failure,developments since then represent an attempt to reverse this situation. Interestingly,ASEAN’s recent relative success in the South China Sea is explained by the U.S.’sincreasing intervention, which has been actively sought by the Philippines and Vietnam,in their capacity as ASEAN vanguard states. Let us review the evidence.
In the face of a perceived threat from China to their territorial interests in the South ChinaSea, Hanoi and Manila have increased co-operation with a more engaged U.S. In July 2013,during President Truong Tan Sang’s visit to the White House, the U.S. and Vietnam signeda comprehensive strategic partnership. In their joint statement, both leaders, ‘reaffirmedtheir support for the settlement of disputes by peaceful means in accordance withinternational law’, and ‘the principle of the non-use of force of threat-of-force in resolvingterritorial and maritime disputes’ (White House Press Secretary, 2013). For its part, theAquino government has reinvigorated the Philippines’ once estranged militaryrelationship with the U.S. In July 2013, Manila and Washington started negotiations onthe establishment of a rotational air and naval agreement that allows for an increasedU.S. military presence (Bradsher, 2013).
In August 2013, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel held talks with President Aquino onthis topic (Zhou, 2013). In December 2013, Secretary of State Kerry made high-profile
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stopovers in Hanoi and Manila, announcing increases in U.S. military aid to both. While inHanoi, Secretary Kerry commented on China’s 23 November declaration of an AerialDefence Identification Zone in the East China Sea, advising Beijing that ‘the zone shouldnot be implemented, and China should refrain from taking similar unilateral actionselsewhere, particularly in the South China Sea’ (Associated Press, 2013). The more robustU.S. response was backed up by action. On 28 April 2014, the Philippines’ DefenseSecretary Voltaire Gazmin and U.S. Ambassador Philip Goldberg signed a ten-yearEnhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) at Camp Aquinaldo, Quezon City.When approved by the Filipino Supreme Court, the agreement will allow for U.S. use ofthe Philippines’ Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Bay (Eilperin, 2014).
Subsequent developments involving Vietnam were to heighten Hanoi’s sense of a need toalign itself more strongly with the U.S. Just ahead of the 24th ASEAN Summit in 10-11 May2014, regional stability took a turn for the worse. Tensions in the Sino-Vietnameserelationship escalated. Just prior to the summit, in what must have been a long-plannedoperation, the Chinese state-owned China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC)towed in a giant 40 storey tall drilling rig to a potential drilling site in the Paracel Islands.These islands are claimed by China and Vietnam, but occupied by China since 1974. AChinese convoy accompanied the rig. It is unclear as to which side started the ramming,but in the ensuing scuffle, both sides’ ships were subject to assault. Vietnamese angerspilled over into physical attacks on Chinese workers in Vietnam. More than 3000Chinese workers had to be evacuated by the Chinese embassy in Hanoi and its consulatein Ho Chi Minh City (Perlez, 2014). Unconfirmed reports suggest that four persons (atleast one of whom was Chinese) were killed, and one hundred and thirty-five wounded.U.S. State Department spokeswoman Jennifer Psaki characterized the Chinese action as a
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‘unilateral action that appears to be part of a broader pattern of Chinese behaviour toadvance claims over disputed territory in a manner that undermines peace and stabilityin the region’ (Dyer and Sevastopulo, 2014). The Vietnamese response was to come later,seen in a direct challenge to the Chinese claims in the South China Sea, both on the basisof international law, and in enhanced relations with the U.S., India and Japan.4
At the May 2014 ASEAN Summit, and unlike the meeting in Phnom Penh 2012, the ASEANforeign ministers issued a statement expressing their ‘serious concerns over the ongoingdevelopments in the South China Sea, which have increased tensions in the area’ (ASEAN,2014). The issue came to a head with a more targeted U.S. intervention. At the annual IISSShangri-la meeting on 31 May, U.S. Secretary of Defense Hagel gave voice to regionalconcerns by directly critiquing Chinese policy (Hagel, 2014). Hagel noted that ‘the U.S.will not look the other way when fundamental principles of the international order arebeing challenged’ (Hagel, 2014). The Chinese response was unequivocal. In hispresentation, the Chinese representative, Lieutenant General Wang Guanzhong, deputychief of general staff of the People’s Liberation Army, strongly contested Hagel’s views(Wang, 2014).
Evidence of diplomatic U.S.-Filipino-Vietnamese co-ordination on the South China Seaissue became increasingly apparent. And, China has responded. In what must surely havebeen previously discussed between the Philippines and the U.S., Manila has followed upon its initial 22 January 2013 submission to the United Nation’s Permanent Court ofArbitration (PCA) in The Hague that protested China’s territorial claims in the SouthChina Sea. On 30 March 2014, a 4000-page dossier was formally submitted. Theaforementioned PCA set a 15 December 2014 cut off date for the consideration of
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competing territorial claims in the South China Sea. A flurry of well-timed activity was inevidence prior to that date. On 5 December, even as Manila announced a spike in Chinesebuilding activity in the Scarborough Shoal, the U.S. State Department released a paperchallenging Chinese claims in the South China Sea (U.S. State Department, 2014). This wasfollowed on 7 December by China’s release of a position paper contesting the Philippines’claims. Beijing’s claims were backed up by a declaration of intent by their State OceanicAdministration to bolster China’s surveillance capacity in the South China Sea by 2020(Straits Times, 2014). On 11 December, Vietnam stated that it had submitted its ownposition paper to the PCA. Hanoi expressed support for Manila’s position, questionedChina’s claims, and asked the tribunal to consider Vietnam’s interests in the matter underconsideration (Heydarian, 2014).
Chinese strategy has evolved, even as the U.S. has displayed an increasing resolve tosupport its ASEAN partners. U.S. satellite imagery of the South China Sea has establishedthat from May 2014 to April 2015, the Chinese have been actively ‘constructing’ land atthe following reefs: Cuarteron, Fiery Cross, Gaven, Hughes, Subi, and the Union reefs(Johnson South and Johnson North reefs) (Thayer, 2015a). As a consequence, the U.S.estimates that China has expanded its territory somewhere in the region of between 1500and 2000 acres (Dou and Hookway, 2015). For example, dredging activity at Hughes Reef,a shoal in the Spratly Islands, has led to the construction of a 90,000 square yard island,complete with a helicopter pad, and radar facility. Significantly, a satellite photo taken ofthe same location in March 2014 revealed only a small concrete platform at high tide. TheU.S. response has been robust. Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral Harry Harriswas quoted as saying that ‘China is creating a great wall of sand with dredges andbulldozers’ (Gladstone and Sanger, 2015).
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In testimony before a Senate Committee in April 2015, then Commander of U.S. PacificCommand, Admiral Samuel Locklear characterized China’s pace of construction in theSouth China Sea as ‘astonishing’ (Tweed, 2015). He further posited that ‘if this activitycontinues at pace, it will give them (China) defacto control of the maritime territory theyclaim’ (Tweed, 2015). Locklear also speculated that this ‘might be a platform if they(China) ever wanted, to establish an air defence zone’ in the South China Sea (Tweed,2015). U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Daniel Russel also objected toChinese policy. He noted that Chinese ‘reclamation isn't necessarily a violation ofinternational law, but it’s certainly violating the harmony, the fengshui of Southeast Asia,and, its certainly violating China’s claim to be a good neighbour and a benign and non-threatening power’ (Denyer, 2015).
The strong U.S. stand has served as an impetus for ASEAN, and particularly the ASEANvanguard states, to adopt a more steely posture. On 15 April 2015, the Philippines’Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario confirmed that Manila was ‘seeking additionalsupport from the United States in terms of being able to take a stronger position indefending our position’ (Minh, 2015). At ASEAN’s 26-28 April 2015 Summit in KualaLumpur, ASEAN’s Vietnamese Secretary General Le Luong Minh strongly contestedChina’s claims in the South China Sea (Otto and Ng, 2015). This was then reinforced bythe newly-appointed Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, who proceeded to make a seriesof explicit critiques of China’s activities in the South China Sea. On 27 May, Carter met theFilipino Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin in Hawaii, where he stressed that the U.S.commitment to defend the Philippines was ‘ironclad’ (Department of Defense, 2015). Atthe annual IISS conference in Singapore from 29-31 May, Carter made clear the U.S.’s
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‘fundamental interest’ in freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. He reiterated theU.S.’s ‘deep concern at the pace and scope of land reclamation in the South China Sea’(Carter, 2015). Significantly, these are the strongest statements made by any officialserving in the Obama administration since 2009 (Rosenberg, 2015). Carter then travelledto Hanoi in June 2015 to sign a joint mission statement, pledging to expand defence tradeand to collaborate on maritime security (Lynch, 2015). In late June, the Philippines heldnaval exercises separately with the U.S. and Japan in Filipino-controlled areas of the SouthChina Sea (Mogato, 2015). In August 2015, after a meeting with head of U.S. PacificCommand, Admiral Harry Harris Jr., the Philippines’ Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazminvouched for the utility of the U.S. military role in the region. Gazmin stated that ‘if thereare Americans flying around there, we won’t be troubled. We need to be helped in ourresupply missions. The best way they could assist is through their presence’ (Gady, 2015).
Vietnam has made similar efforts to seek out U.S. security commitments, and to bolsterties with the United States. These have been reciprocated by the U.S., suggesting acompelling convergence of interests. Between 6 July and 10 July 2015, the Secretary-General of the Vietnam Communist Party, Nguyen Phu Trong, made an unprecedentedvisit to the United States. This was the first visit by a serving chief of the Communist Partyof Vietnam. Obama confirmed that the two had ‘discussed the importance of resolvingmaritime disputes in the South China Sea and throughout the Asia-Pacific in accordancewith international law’ (White House Press Secretary, 2015a). Similarly, Trong confirmedthat the two had ‘shared our concern about the recent activities [in the South China Sea]that are not in accordance with international law that may complicate the situation’(White House Press Secretary, 2015a).
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While the following might be interpreted as a pro forma statement, the preface to thoseremarks included a joint statement expressing their unequivocal concern at recentdevelopments in the South China Sea (White House Press Secretary, 2015a). OtherVietnamese officials have driven home the point. Speaking at the Asia Society in New Yorkon 28 September 2015, Vietnam’s President Truong Tan Sang commented on China’s landreclamation in the South China Sea, which had just been reaffirmed by Chinese PresidentXi in an interview with the Wall Street Journal. Sang claimed that ‘acts by China seriouslyaffect the maritime safety and security in the East Sea’ and ‘violate international law’(Daniszewski and Pennington, 2015). Moreover, Sang had warm words for the UnitedStates, stating that there is no mistrust between the two nations, and that ‘the momentthe United States fully lifts the ban on lethal weapons sales to Vietnam, [it] will send asignal to the whole world that the Vietnam-U.S. relations have been fullynormalized’ (Daniszewski and Pennington, 2015).
While China has not directly challenged the U.S. since its articulation of a much clearerposition on the South China Sea disputes, it has continued to alter the status quo in subtleways. The next Chinese move was to construct a pair of lighthouses on its existingterritories on Cuareton Reef and Johnson South Reef (Torde, 2015). But, again, unlike thepre-2013 period, the U.S. has responded quickly. On 26 October, in a move that wasjustified under the principle of freedom of navigation, the USS Lassen, a guided missiledestroyer, went inside the twelve nautical mile exclusive economic zone of the Spratlyislands occupied by China (Lubold, 2015). As the U.S. staked out this more robust posture,on 29 October, the U.N. Arbitral tribunal in The Hague unanimously ruled that it hadjurisdiction to hear the Philippines’ 2013 submission challenging China’s claims in theSouth China Sea (Deutsch, 2015). This move was welcomed by the U.S. and rejected by
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China. On 3 November, during a visit to Beijing, Admiral Harris presented U.S. activitiesin the South China Sea as an instance of supporting the principle of freedom of navigation,and critically, as unexceptional (Perlez, 2015). In a highly symbolic move that backed upHarris’ words, on 5 November, Carter visited the U.S. aircraft carrier the USS TheodoreRoosevelt, as it traversed the South China Sea. During his visit, Carter was quoted to theeffect that ‘there is a lot of concern about Chinese behaviour out here. Many countries arecoming to the United States and asking us to do more with them, so that we can keep thepeace out here’ (Ferdinando, 2015).
To underline the point, on 8 November, two B-52’s flew near the disputed Spratly Islands.And, on his return to the U.S., Secretary Carter expressed in no uncertain terms that theU.S. ‘joins virtually everyone else in the region in being deeply concerned about the paceand scope of land reclamation in the South China Sea’ (Agence France Presse, 2015). Inthe face of this sustained opposition, the Chinese clarified their stance on the South ChinaSea, even if the fundamental position remained the same. On 7 November, ChinesePresident Xi stated in a speech in Singapore that China was committed to freedom ofnavigation, even as he asserted that the islands in the South China Sea were ‘China’s sinceancient times’ (Wong, 2015). According to Xi ‘there has been no problem with maritimenavigation or overland flights, nor will there ever be in the future’ (Wong 2015). Whilesome might see in that statement a more co-operative stance on maritime security, otherswould just as easily read in it a Chinese commitment to guarantee freedom of navigationin the South China Sea, which is not the same thing.
In any case, the Philippines is clearly pleased that its efforts to engage the U.S. on theSouth China Sea issue have been successful. Following the USS Lassen episode in the
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Spratly Islands, Philippines President Aquino told a forum hosted by the ForeignCorrespondents Association of the Philippines on 27 October that he had ‘no issue’ withthe U.S. move, and that he believed ‘everybody would welcome a balance of power’ in theSouth China Sea (Sabillo, 2015a). Interest convergence between the U.S. and thePhilippines was further solidified when President Obama met with President Aquino on18 November 2015. Obama stated his desire to ‘reaffirm our [the U.S.’s] unwaveringcommitment to the security and defence of the Philippines’ (Philstar, 2015). Heconfirmed that the U.S. is ‘especially committed to ensuring maritime security in theregion’, and that it will be increasing ‘maritime security assistance to the Philippines torecord levels, including two new vessels’ (Philstar, 2015). Obama stated that he andAquino had agreed on the need for ‘bold steps to lower tensions, including pledging tohalt further reclamation, new construction, and militarisation of disputed areas in theSouth China Sea’ (Philstar, 2015). At the same time, Aquino confirmed that thePhilippines-U.S. security alliance ‘remains a cornerstone of peace and stability in the AsiaPacific’, and reiterated the importance of U.S. contributions to Filipino security, that ‘helpus ensure that we can ably respond to current security challenges, particularly in the areaof maritime security and maritime awareness’ (White House Press Secretary, 2015b).Aquino took the opportunity to ‘reiterate the Philippines’ view that the freedom ofnavigation and overflight in the South China Sea must be continuously upheld consistentwith international law’ (White House Press Secretary, 2015b).
Interestingly, there has also been increasing evidence of high-level dialogue between thePhilippines and Vietnam, which further supports their classification as vanguard states.On September 2015, Vietnamese Ambassador to the Philippines Truong Trieu Duongstated that the two would ‘deepen…cooperation in order to solve all the issues concerning
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the South China Sea in a most peaceful way in accordance with international law’ (StraitsTimes, 2015). A strategic partnership was signed on 17 November, when the two leadersmet at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, held in Manila. PresidentTruong stated that ‘President [Aquino] and I shared our concerns over the recentdevelopments in the East Sea or the South China Sea, affecting trust, peace, security andstability in the region. We also reaffirmed the importance of ensuring the stability,maritime security, safety and freedom of navigation and of flight in the South China Sea’(Sabillo, 2015b). For his part, Aquino stated that ‘in terms of defence relations, we [thePhilippines] welcome the active engagement and cooperation between our respectivedefense and military establishments’ (Sabillo, 2015). He continued, that ‘as seafaringpeoples, we look to initiatives that will enhance our capacities to better respond tochallenges and situations in our common seas’ (Orendain, 2015). As one regional analystnoted, ‘the message is very clear, that China’s neighbours are beginning to form aninformal alliance’ (Heydarian, cited in Orendain, 2015).
Objections
There are a number of possible queries, which may be raised to the argument proposed.
First, can ASEAN be understood as a unified entity? Drawing on the pioneering work ofFrederick Frey (1985), we contend that ASEAN can be conceptualised as a unitary actorduring those periods when ASEAN displays a sufficiently united front in support ofvanguard state interests. As Frey (1985, p. 144) points out, ‘absolutely unitary action isa naively impractical criterion for a group actor’. However, he argues that if group actors‘display sufficient behavioural cohesion among members so as to produce unitary group
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actor behaviour’, then evidence of minor deviations from cohesion should not result indenial of group actor designation (Frey, 1985, p.142).
Relating this discussion to ASEAN, our view is that ASEAN unity is not something to beassumed. ASEAN unity waxes and wanes. It develops in specific circumstances. Thus,ASEAN can be understood as a unified entity during those periods when ASEAN displaysa united front in support of a/the vanguard state(s). This occurred during the Cold War,when Thailand acted as ASEAN’s vanguard state and established significant interestconvergence with an external actor, the People’s Republic of China from 1979-91. Despitedivisions within ASEAN, the organization was sufficiently unified to act as a unitary actorin Frey’s terms, and projected an admittedly far from perfect, but still cohesive unitedfront. This allowed ASEAN, in cooperation with China, to successfully counter Vietnamesepolicy, a state that had defeated the French, and the U.S. At other times, as in the case ofthe South China Sea dispute investigated here, interest convergence, and hence, unitybetween the vanguard states, the Philippines and Vietnam, and the external actor, theU.S., is very much a work in progress. That said, interest convergence is strengthening asevents in the South China Sea take a turn for the worse, with China’s deployment of twomissile batteries in the Paracel Islands in February 2016 (Brunnstrom and Blanchard,2016).
A second, and related, query is whether Vietnam and the Philippines are merely pursuingtheir own self-interest on the South China Sea. This view, if correct, significantlyundermines the utility of the vanguard concept, which focuses on the interaction betweenthe vanguard state(s) and ASEAN members to explain ASEAN policy. Here, it is importantto highlight the functions performed by a ‘vanguard state’. An ASEAN vanguard state has
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a number of interrelated functions: It seeks to set the ASEAN agenda, and developcohesion in support of its interests in the international context, whether that be inmultilateral forums, or with respect to key external actors. How successful, or otherwise,a vanguard state is at performing these functions will directly impact its ability to resistsovereignty violation from external actors. To date, in the case of the South China Seaissue, there has been some success on the part of Hanoi and Manila in working withASEAN to establish interest convergence with the U.S., an external power. Our argumentis that Vietnam and the Philippines need to increasingly act in their capacity as vanguardstates and focus on developing ASEAN unity, even as they seek interest convergence withthe U.S. In the event of a failure to do these things, they will continue to have theirsovereignty undermined by China.
A third query concerns the vanguard states discussed in this article. Do Vietnam and thePhilippines have a greater propensity for being vanguard states on the South China Seaissue? How might the theory be applied to other ASEAN states? According to vanguardstate theory, a vanguard state is any ASEAN state that has the most compelling interestsat stake in a given issue. In the case of the South China Sea dispute, this is Vietnam andthe Philippines. Therefore, these are the vanguard states. Why Vietnam and thePhilippines and not another ASEAN state? First, there are only four ASEAN states withcompeting claims in the South China Sea: Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei.We would not expect an ASEAN state that did not have a competing sovereignty claimwith China to have a compelling interest at stake in the dispute. This effectively rules outthe other ASEAN members. Second, history matters. Malaysia and Brunei historicallyhave had more co-operative ties with China than the remaining claimants. This willundoubtedly have had an impact on their response to the issue. Thus, these states have
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preferred a non-confrontational approach, largely accommodating China(Parameswaran, 2015). Vietnam, on the other hand, has a mixed history of being analliance partner (1950-78) of China’s, as well as having extremely strained relations withChina. This is reflected in the actual use of military force over the Spratly islands in 1988,and other lower level, but still real frictions since then. Similarly, the Philippines havetraditionally been a U.S. alliance partner since 1951, rather than China. And, asdocumented here, this relationship has deteriorated in recent years (Heydarian, 2015).
A fourth query concerns the external actor with which ASEAN establishes interestconvergence. It might be queried why we have identified the United States as ASEAN’sactor of choice. Why not Japan? It is true that Japan is increasing its interest in SoutheastAsia, and in particular, regional maritime regional disputes. On 12 May 2015, joint navaldrills were conducted between Japan and the Philippines in the South China Sea (Hayashi,2015). On 4 June, in direct opposition to Chinese calls, Japan signed an agreement toprovide naval patrol vessels to the Philippines (Rajagopalan, Takenaka, and Wee, 2015).The Japanese–Vietnamese relationship is also strengthening. From 15-18 September, theSecretary-General of the Vietnam Communist Party Nguyen Phu Trong, visited Japan. AMemorandum on Cooperation between Coast Guard Agencies was signed. In a joint visionstatement, it was declared that both sides ‘share many fundamental interests’ (JapanMinistry of Foreign Affairs, 2015). While Japan has clear converging interests with Manilaand Hanoi, not least freedom of navigation and limiting Chinese power projection ability,the U.S. has even more compelling interests at stake, and significantly greater capabilitiesto effect change on the part of Chinese policy. While Japan can assist ASEAN at themargins, it cannot balance Chinese power and policy in East Asia. It takes a great powerto balance a great power. On this point, it is clear that for ASEAN, the U.S. is the preferred
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partner to counter Chinese policy in the South China Sea. As we argue, this is increasinglyoccurring.
Finally, has this example of interest convergence improved ASEAN’s security? This isultimately a counterfactual question. We attempt to make a plausible case that ASEAN’ssecurity has improved by the actions of the vanguard states. Since we are dealing with acounterfactual, we have to compare our present situation to one where China wasallowed to proceed unopposed with its South China Sea policy. Our argument is that tothe extent that the Chinese now face an increasingly active U.S. naval maritime presence,and thus acts as a counterbalance in the South China Sea, the answer that ASEANvanguard state actions have improved ASEAN security is yes.
Conclusion
A variety of explanations have been offered in the literature to explain ASEAN’s policy onthe South China Sea. None is totally satisfactory. This article offers an alternativeexplanation rooted in the logic of neo-realist theory, in its capacity as a theory of foreignpolicy. In this interpretation, the Philippines and Vietnam have taken on the dual role ofvanguard states in ASEAN’s response to China’s policy in the South China Sea. In the pre-2013 period, these states unsuccessfully sought to resist sovereignty violations fromChina. This is because U.S. interests on this issue had not converged sufficiently with thatof the Philippines and Vietnam. Washington was simply too distracted by developmentsin the Middle East and Northeast Asia, and put Southeast Asia on the back-burner. In thepost-2013 period, an increasing convergence of interests between the U.S. on one hand,
32
and the Philippines and Vietnam on the other, has led to a stronger regional pushbackagainst Chinese policy in the South China Sea. The theoretical implications of this casestudy should be noted. Our study strongly suggests that ASEAN’s autonomy is not asunqualified as claimed by constructivist theorists. Neither is it as restricted as realist andcritical theorists contend. Rather, it is a contingent type of autonomy, reflecting aninterest convergence between a specific ASEAN vanguard state (or states) and anexternal actor. Agency rests in these parties. To highlight one without the other missesan important aspect of what is occurring. Power also matters in this process, since onlyan external great power can balance a regional great power.
Looking to the future, absent the continuation of a robust but measured U.S. interventionpolicy, China's control over the South China Sea is a geographical and technologicalinevitability. Thus, the Obama administration's recent policy under Ashton Carter is amove in the right direction. That said, the message of vanguard state theory is that forthis push-back to be sustained, co-ordination and commitment will be required on thepart of the Philippines, Vietnam, and the U.S. It is also vital that the Philippines andVietnam engage and mobilize the remaining ASEAN members, to portray a united ASEANfront. Should this effort falter, vanguard state theory predicts that ASEAN sovereigntywill continue to be compromised, and ASEAN’s diplomats will labour in vain.
Notes
1. This section contains and expands upon the theoretical argument first outlined inSouthgate, L. (2015). ASEAN and the Dynamics of Resistance to Sovereignty
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Violation: The Case of the Third Indochina War (1978-91). Journal of Asian
Security and International Affairs, 2(2), 200-221.2. For a constructivist conception of state interests, see Finnemore, M. (1996).
National Interests in International Society. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. ForFinnemore (1996, p. 2), ‘interests are constructed through socialinteraction…[and] are defined in the context of internationally held norms andunderstandings about what is good and appropriate’. For the pluralist conceptionof state interests, see the summary of that view in Krasner, S. (1984). Review:Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics.
Comparative Politics, 16(2), 223-246. In this view, civil society is made up of a‘plethora of diverse, fluctuating, competing groups of individuals with sharedinterests’ (Krasner, 1984, p. 226). These groups ‘struggle to maximize their own,autonomously defined self-interests’ (Krasner, 1984, p. 226).3. The People’s Republic of China has a long-standing claim to the territories in theSouth China Sea, dating back to August 1951. Force has been used by China on anumber of occasions, most notably against South Vietnam in 1974, and against aunified Vietnam in 1988.4. During a state visit by Vietnamese President Truong Tan Sang from 16-19 March2014, Tokyo and Hanoi turned their eight-year old ‘Strategic Partnership’ into an‘Extensive Strategic Partnership’. In late October 2014, during Vietnamese PrimeMinister Nguyen Tan Dung’s visit to New Delhi, Vietnam encouraged India tosupport the peaceful resolution of the disputes in the South China. Hanoi alsoencouraged India to deepen its oil exploration activities in the South China Sea. Ithas also established a comprehensive partnership with Australia in 2015 (Thayer,2015b).
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